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Due to a lot of entities engaged in PPP, such as government (central state or 
local) authority or a government-owned enterprise, project sponsors, construc-
tion  companies,  providers  of  necessary  equipment,  plant  operators,  insurers, 
etc., they must to co-operate one another. This co-operation in some cases could 
be examining as a game. The better understanding of PPP games can decrease 
costs and potential losses. Because of relatively short time of functioning of PPP 
we should carefully prescribe obligations and rights of every partner and think 




Public-private partnership (PPP) is a 
form of co-operation of public and pri-
vate sector, aiming at the realisation of 
public tasks connected to supplying pub-
lic goods and services by private firms or 
with their participation. The significance 
and forms of PPP have been developing 
for several years according to changes in 
economic, social and political conditions 
of  economic  activity.  At  present,  PPP 
can be treated as an important instrument 
of providing public goods, especially if 
we  take  to  the  consideration  budgeting 
constraints.  There  are  a  lot  of  benefits 
with applying PPP, e.g. increasing of the 
quality  of  public  goods,  decreasing  of 
costs  of  their  providing,  more  efficient 
allocation  of  resources.  In  the  case  of 
engaging a lot of entities in the realisa-
tion of any project such as government 
(central  state  or  local)  authority  or  a 
government-owned  enterprise,  project 
sponsors,  construction  companies,  pro-
viders of necessary equipment, plant op-
erators,  insurers,  etc.,  they  must  co-
operate one another. In order to under-
stand motivation both public sector and 
private sector it is useful to examine PPP 
as a social game. Game theory contrib-
utes to better understanding the mecha-
nism  of  PPP  and  accompanying  social 




Nowadays  PPP  is  becoming  an  im-
portant  instrument  of  infrastructure  de-
velopment in Europe.  One  of  the  main 
imperative of UE policy in this area is an 
improvement of efficiency and quality of 
public services.  The most important in-
centive of PPP development is apprecia-
tion  of  the  role  of  private  sector  in 
achieving  public  aims  –  providing  of 
public  goods  and  services  (such  as: 
transport infrastructure, waste utilization, 
health  and  education  services,  etc.).  In 
order to take such collaboration it is im-
portant to understand mechanism of eco-
nomic  cooperation,  which  allows  using 
advantages both public and private sec-
tor in increasing of social welfare. Use-
ful guidance in exploring PPP field could 





The  authors  exploit  descriptive 
method in order to analyze the theoreti-
cal aspects of PPP and game theory.  
 
Public-private partnership – some 
theoretical implication 
 
It  is  very  difficult  to  analyse  public-
private  partnership  (PPP)  in  theoretical 
context, because there is no clear-cut (un-
ambiguous)  definition  of  this  concept  in 
economic literature. Apart from that it is 
worth  mentioning  that  PPP  is  still  trans-
forming. Now we would like to introduce 
some  interpretations  of  this  concept  with 
special regard to some economic, legal, so-
cial and psychological aspects.  
Critical survey of different meanings 
of PPP deriving from liberal and conser-
vative  ideology  we  could  find  in  S.H. 
Linder’s article (S. H. Linder, 1999, pp. 
35-51.). In accordance to his classifica-
tion we could distinguish: 
§  Public-private  partnership  as  a 
management  reform  –  promoting  part-
nership as innovating tool, which could 
change  the  way  of  functioning  of  the 
government,  because  public  sector  will 
be  treated  by  market  discipline  (liberal 
conception). 
§  Public-private  partnership  as  a 
conversion problem – from this point of 
view partnership is not treated as a tool 
of changing the way of management but 
as  a  tool  serving  the  solving  of  most 
problems accompanying providing pub-
lic goods. In this meaning it is important 
to persuade private sector to taking from 
public sector the realisation of its tasks, 
which will cause the decreasing of costs. 
Private sector gives know-how and their 
financial resources and public sector de-
creases tax burdens and can provide ad-
ditional funds.  
§  Public-private  partnership  as  a 
moral  renovation  –  partnership  has  a 
mental influence on people engaging in 
that,  e.g.  the  nationalisation  of  public 
service  enterprises  in  Great  Britain 
(Thatcherism). The main purpose is giv-
ing  people  a  chance  for  ownership  of 
shares of utilities sold by the state on the 
stock market. 
§  Public-private  partnership  as  a 
risk shifting – transfer of the risk means 
that private sector supports public sector. 
Private  sector,  which  jointed  to  co-
operative enterprise is some kind of  fi-
nancial lever for public funds but doesn’t 
replace them. Aims are the same even if 
financial resources are mixed. 
§  Public-private  partnership  as  re-
construction of public sector (public ser-
vices) – partnership can serve as a way 
of movement public servants to private 
sector  and as  a  way  of  deregulation  of 
labour market. 
§  Public-private  partnership  as  a 
sharing  of  the  power  –  partnership  can 
fundamentally  change  relations  between 
public  and  private  sector.  Ethos  of  co-
operation  and  trust  replaces  adversarial 
relations specific for command-and- con-
trol  regulations.  Apart  from  it  relations 
between  partners  have  multilaterally 
beneficial  division  of  responsibility, 
knowledge  and  risk.  Each  partner  con-
tributes to create some exchange value. It 
stimulates innovation and cost saving. 
As S. H. Linder said these six mean-
ings  of  PPP  we  can  examine  from  lin-
gual point of view.  In this context there 
is no place for usual events of partner-
ship  with non-profit  sector,  with  social 
organisations,  schools,  churches.
  1  This 
kind of partnership is worth investigating 
too 
                                                 
1 In Polish economic literature it is worth seeing: S. 
Golinowska,  D.  Głogosz  (red.),  Pozarządowe  insty-
tucje społeczne. Między państwem a społeczeństwem, 
Instytut  Pracy  i  Spraw  socjalnych,  Instytut  Polityki 
Społecznej UW, Warszawa 1999. Gazdálkodás Vol. 51. Special edition No. 19 
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-  such  public-public  or  private-
private partnership can have its historical  
roots in given communities, which is de-
veloping with time; 
-  rhetoric  of  this  partnership  has 
typically  ethical  connotation,  bounding 
with satisfying social needs; 
-  lack of profit motivation changes 
the dynamics of such partnership. 
In above  discussion  we  omit the as-
pect of privatisation, but PPP can be con-
sidering  as  a  privatisation  process  too. 
Above-mentioned  definitions  were  de-
signed in such a way, in order to show 
what  partnership  can  be.  Now  we  will 
concentrate on explaining the functioning 
of PPP in economic context. In „Guide-
lines  for  Public  Private  Partnerships” 
 
(European  Commission  (a)  2003,  p.  s. 
16.) we could find following definition: 
„PPP  is  a  form  of  collaboration  be-
tween public in private sector aiming at 
realisation a project  or  supplying public 
services traditionally providing by public 
sector.  Both  public  and  private  sector 
achieve some benefits adequate to degree 
of  realising  specific  tasks  by  them.  By 
enabling every sector doing, what it can 
best, public services or infrastructure are 
providing in the most efficient way. The 
main purpose of PPP is shaping such rela-
tions between parties to taking the risk by 
the sector, which can control it best then. 
We  think  that  it  is  the  best  definition, 
promoted by European Union now. 
 
CO-OPERATION IN GAME THEORY 
 
Game  theory  provides  simple  tools, 
which allow observing dependencies be-
tween entities activity. Its greatest worth 
is contribution to explaining the mecha-
nism  of  competition  and  co-operation. 
Most  of the relationships between enti-
ties are neither strict conflicting nor strict 
co-operative.  Using  the  terminology  of 
the game theory, most of the social inter-
actions are non-zero-sum games, which 
means games between players whose in-
terests  aren’t  either  totally  opposite  or 
fully coherent. In other worlds between 
players  exist  rivalry  that  does  not  ex-
clude possibility of co-operation. 
Non-zero-sum  game’s  solutions  are 
Nash  equilibrium  – the  situation  where 
no player has anything to gain by chang-
ing only his or her own strategy. If each 
player  has  chosen  a  strategy  and  no 
player can benefit by changing his or her 
strategy  while  the  other  players  keep 
theirs unchanged, then the current set of 
strategy  choices  and  the  corresponding 
payoffs  constitute  a  Nash  equilibrium 
(Nash,  1950). The  most  often  analysed 
game  illustrating  social  dilemmas  is 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. 
In PD game Nash equilibrium is ob-
tained when both players decide not to 
co-operate.  The  solution  of  the  game 
representing  Nash  equilibrium  is  the 
consequence  of  individual  rationality 
principle. Rationality is the property of 
maximising  one’s  pay-off  and  taking 
into account the fact that the opponent is 
also rational and also is trying to maxi-
mise  his  payoff  (Rapoport,  1988).  Fol-
lowing  one’s  rationality  in  cases  illus-
trated by PD game causes a conflict be-
tween the self-interest and collective in-
terest.  According  to  the  logic  of  the 
group rationality, represented by Pareto 
optimum, we shouldn’t accept a solution 
if there is another one, more effective for 
all  players  or  more  effective  for  one 
player but not less effective for another 
player. From a self-interested standpoint, 
in  PD  no  matter  what  another  player 
would choose, the best strategy is to de-
fect. As a consequence, the solution of 
the game is not optimal in Pareto sense. 
The dilemma is that the optimal choice 
for each player leads to a suboptimal col-






Selected definitions of Public-Private Partnership 
 
European  Commission,  Guidelines 
for  Public  Private  Partnerships, 
(2003) 
 
„PPP is a form of collaboration between public in private sector aiming at realisa-
tion a project or supplying public services traditionally providing by public sector. 
Both public and private sector achieve some benefits adequate to degree of realis-
ing by them specific tasks. By enabling every sector to do, what it can best, public 
services or infrastructure are providing in the most efficient way. The main pur-
pose of PPP is shaping such relations between parties to taking the risk by sector, 
which can control it best then. 
European  Commission,  Public  fi-
nances  in  EMU,  European  Econ-
omy, 3/2003 (2003), p. 128 
Public-Private Partnership concerns transfer investments projects from public sec-
tor to private sector, which traditionally were realised by public sector. 
P. A. Grout, Public and private sec-
tor discount rates in public-private 
partnerships,  Economic  Journal, 
Mar 2003, Vol. 113 Issue 486, p. 
C62-C68. 
 
„In the last twenty years there has been a major increase in the role of the private 
sector in the delivery of what were once considered public sector services. Outside 
of transition economies, probably the single most significant change  has been the 
international wave of privatisation of utilities. Such privatisations typically in-
volve the complete transfer of ownership to the private sector with the role of the 
state being reduced to policing prices and conduct. More recently, however, there 
has been a rapid growth in more complex forms of private involvement. In many 
cases the public sector or its agencies remain the immediate final purchaser of the 
services but no longer own or operate the assets necessary for the provision of the 
service. Such arrangements tend to be referred to as public-private partnerships. 
In a typical PPP the government and the private consortium designs, builds, owns 
and runs the physical assets required for delivery of the service. This contracts 
with traditional public sector provision where the government builds or purchases 
physical assets, retains ownership and uses public sector employees or a private 
contractor to deliver the required service. A PPP can be characterised as a situa-
tion where the government becomes a purchaser of services not physical assets. 
This type of arrangement is now common in the case of roads, prisons, hospitals 
and schools both in UK and elsewhere.” 
J.  Blöndal,  Market  Type  Mecha-
nisms  and the Provision  of Public 
Services, OECD Journal on Budg-
eting,  Volume  5,  No.  1,  OECD 
2005, p. 90 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) refer to arrangements whereby the private sec-
tor finances, designs, builds, maintains, and operates (DBFMO) infrastructure as-
sets traditionally provided by the public sector. 
D. Grimsey, M.K. Lewis, Account-
ing  for  Public Private Partnership, 
Accounting Forum, Sep-Dec 2002, 
vol. 26, Issue3/4, p. 248 
Accordingly, for our purpose, PPPs can be defined as agreements where public 
sector bodies enter into long-term contractual agreements in which private parties 
participate in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure, and a PPP 
project results in a contract for a private entity to deliver public infrastructure-
based services. A fundamental feature is that the government does not own the in-
frastructure but, rather, contracts to buy infrastructure and related ancillary ser-
vices from the private sector over time. Traditionally, infrastructure procurement 
has been viewed as asset procurement; decisions relating to the provision, produc-
tion, and financing of assets as well as the operation and maintenance of the ser-
vices were undertaken by the public sector. Assets were procured from private 
sector contractors the responsibilities of which were limited to the construction of 
the asset, and the risks associated with the operation of the facility remained with 
the public sector. With a PPP, the emphasis is upon the purchase of services not 
the procurement of an asset. Under the PPP contract, the government pays for ser-
vices provided to it by the private sector over time. These services are delivered 
utilising the new infrastructure built by the private sector entities as part of the 
service arrangement. 
Ministry  of Economy  and Labour, 
Regional  Policy  Department  Pub-
lic-Private Partnership as a method 
of realisation of public tasks, War-
saw 2005 r., Poland, p. 3.  
Public-Private Partnership as a long term collaboration between public and private 
sector  in  enterprises  aiming  at  realisation  public  tasks.  The  main  purpose  is 
achievement of mutual benefits both social and economical at a given enterprise.  
 Public-Private  Partnership  Act  28 
July    2005  (Dz.U.  no  169,  pos. 
1420) 
Poland 
Art. 1. par. 2  „Public-private partnership is collaboration between public and pri-
vate sector, based on a  partnership agreement (contract), serving realisation pub-
lic tasks, with saving principles of this Act.” 
Art.2. par.1 „The subject of partnership contract is realisation by private sector 
the project (with proper payment) for public sector. 
par.2 „Private partner takes all or more costs of realisation or secure taking these 
costs by other entities. 
Source: own study 





















SPV – Special Purpose Vehicle 
Source: Raport Amerykańskiej Izby Handlowej w Polsce, Partnerstwo publiczno-prywatne jako 
metoda rozwoju infrastruktury w PolsceWarszawa 2002, s. 7; por. także: D. Grimsey, M.K. 
Lewis, Accounting for Public Private Partnership, Accounting Forum, Sep-Dec 2002, vol. 26, 
Issue3/4, s. 254. 
Figure 2 
Nash Equilibrium of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
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Source: own study 
Figure 3 
 
Nash Equilibrium and Pareto optimum of the Prisoner Dilemma Game 
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Source: own study 
 
 


































































Observation  of  social  interactions 
shows very often that they are played as a 
PD game and in consequence the obtained 
outcome  is  suboptimal.  Hence there  are 
many researches which try to find the so-
lution of this issue. According to the eco-
nomic  game theory, the players  can  es-
cape this trap if the game is iterated. The 
shadow  of  the  future  should  determine 
players to co-operation. But if the game is 
repeated  and  the  number  of  iteration  is 
given then the player would take an ad-
vantage by defection in the last interac-
tion.  However  according  to  this  logic 
there emerges the „domino effect” and as 
its consequence the only rational decision 
is not to co-operate at all. Fortunately real 
life  does  not  prove  that  this  effect  is  a 
common  problem  because  most  people 
don’t use this logic. Moreover, in many 
situations  described  by  the  PD  game, 
players don’t know how many times they 
will  be  interacting  (Straffin,  2004).  If 
there  isn’t  the  last  domino  block,  the 
problem of the „domino effect” won’t ex-
ist. Answering the question: „how to ex-
clude the last domino block” we should 
consider  a  proper  strategy  of  the  game 
taking  into  account  conditions  in  which 
the game is played. In the case of iterated 
n-person  PD  game  without  the  exit  op-
tion, that means that the player isn’t al-
lowed to choose partners and has to play 
with each player, experiments show that 
the most effective strategy is Tit-for-Tat 
(Axelrode,  1984).  The  principle  of  this 
strategy is to co-operate when the partner 
co-operates and defect when the partner 
defects. An agent using this strategy will 
initially co-operate, then respond in kind 
to  a  previous  opponent's  action.  That 
means that we should begin the game by 
co-operation  and  keep  on  co-operation 
unless our opponent defects and get back 
to co-operation only if the opponent does. 
Instead in the case of the games with the 
exit  option  Out-for-Tat  strategy  is  more 
effective  (Yamagishi – Nahoko,  1996). 
Similarly to TFT an agent using this strat-
egy will initially co-operate, then respond 
to a previous opponent’s action. The dif-
ference is that the reaction to opponent’s 
defection is not defection but it is deser-
tion. In other words when the opponent 
defects, we should walk away and find a 
new partner. Most real-life PD games in-
volve the ability to abandon an undesir-
able partner and look for someone else. 
We should choose our partner very care-
fully, and analyse its nature to predict its 
anticipated  liability  of  defection.  If  the 
player  is  an  aggressive  one  it  will  be 
tempted  to  play  „hit  and  run”  strategy, 
and can use the exit option to exploit new 
partners and then escape retaliation. But if 
the player is  a defensive  one  it  will  be 
playing  „flee  rather  than  fight”  strategy 
and will use the exit option to avoid de-
fectors  and  remain  with  co-operators 
(Boone – Macy, 1999). The serious prob-
lem  emerges  when  a  relation  involves 
only one interaction or there is only one 
partner we can interact with. In these cir-
cumstances  the  most  important  thing  is 
influencing  the  future  behaviour  of  the 
partner  before  the  interaction  begins.  In 
this context we should consider appropri-
ate strategic moves which ensure partner 
co-operation  such  as  commitments, 
threats and promises. The effectiveness of 
all  these  incentives  require  credibility 
which  means  the  other  player  must  be-
lieve  that  you  not renege, that  you  will 
follow  through  (Schelling, 1960).  Thus 
the building block of co-operation is mu-
tual credibility of partners. This credibil-
ity can be confirmed by positive reputa-
tion of partner or enforced by contract. 
 
SPECIFIC CONDITIONS  
OF GAMING PPP 
 
Most PPP schemes can be identified 
as  sequential  games:  e.g.  model  BOT 
(Build  –  Operate  –  Transfer)  includes Gazdálkodás Vol. 51. Special edition No. 19 
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three main phases, model BOOTT (Build 
– Own – Operate –Train – Transfer) in-
cludes  five  main  phases.  Generally  we 
can  look  at  the  PPP  as  at  a  four-stage 
model including: 1) preparation of enter-
prise, 2) implementation, 3) design and 
construction,  4)  operating  and  mainte-
nance. So many stages of realization of 
PPP  scheme  can  suggest  that  it  makes 
sense to interpret PPP as a game due to a 
set of interactions involving players with 
a complex character, particular strategy, 
behavior,  interest,  pay-off  etc.  Thus  a 
very important thing is to analyze all po-
tential risks and benefits (pay-offs) asso-
ciated with realization of a given activity 
as a PPP and their distribution between 
parties. In below table  we examine the 
different stages of PPP with division of 




Responsibility for realisation of different stages of PPP 
 
Preparation of the  
enterprise 
Implementation  Designing and  
construction 
Operating and  
maintenance 
Private sector 
-  identification and 
evaluation of different 
(specific risks) bound-
ing (connecting) with 
the enterprise 
-  defining of optimal 
structure of the enter-
prise 
-  forming of special pur-
pose vehicle SPV), re-
sponsible for realisation 
of works  
-  making the best bid 
(tender, offer) for reali-
sation of  the project 
-  collecting special per-
missions, decisions, 
opinions 
-  forecast of incomes 
from realisation of the 
enterprise (added value) 
-  giving the price for re-
alisation of the enter-
prise (payment mecha-
nism)  
-  collecting needed funds 
for the realisation 
-  defining financial struc-
ture of the enterprise 
and special securities 
-  negotiations of condi-
tions of collaboration 
with undercontructors 
-  doing appropriate 
works connected with 
fittings (building site) 
-  constructing of detailed 
technical project 
-  constructing  the object 
(infrastructure) accord-
ing to schedule and 
payments 
-  efficient transmission 
(transfer) the infrastruc-
ture to operating for 
operate partnership 
-  insurance of the infra-
structure 
-  operating and mainte-
nance of the infrastruc-
ture and reconstruction 
investments 
-  good quality (condition) 
of the infrastructure in 
the moment of transfer-
ring it to public sector 
-  debt service and realisa-
tion of returns for share-
holders of SPV 
-  taking different risks – 
insurance, inflation risk) 
Public sector 
-  defining of the enter-
prise and preparing 
initial documentation 
-  formation of special 
implementing group 
responsible for work-
ing out detailed speci-
fication of enterprise 
and suitable materials 
and information 
needed to realization 
of the enterprise  
-  preparation 
-  making formal deci-
sion about the realiza-
tion 
-  hire(ing) of group ad-
viser 
-  preparation of tender-
ing documentation 
-  organization of public 
procurement 
-  collecting and securing 
funds needed to realisa-
tion season payments 
for private sector 
-  buying lands and infra-
structure using rights 
connected to the enter-
prise 
-  collecting special per-
missions, decisions and 
opinions 
-  choosing the best of-
ferer 
-  negotiating the final 
conditions of the reali-
zation of the enterprise 
-  monitoring of private 
sector 
-  negotiating possible 
changes of specifica-
tion of public pro-
curement  
-  alternatively – reali-
zation of insurance 
obligations 
monitoring of private sector 
payments for private sector 
Source: Raport Amerykańskiej Izby Handlowej w Polsce, Partnerstwo publiczno-prywatne jako 





Considerating PPP as a game we must 
take into account that it is played in the 
environment  with  imperfect  and  incom-
plete information. That means that players 
must  take  steps  to  maximize  their  bar-
gaining power by enlarging their access to 
information.  In  public  service  decision 
making the most important are following 
issues (Scharle, 2002, pp. 239-240)  
·  all  entities  involved  in  decision 
making process should have the same in-
formation about relevant parameters, 
·  integrity  of  public  sector  depends 
on symmetric and/or perfect information of 
the administration outside public interest, 
·  public sector should use advanced 
assessment tools in its decisions, 
·  very important role of public me-
dia in monitoring of PPP project, 
·  some times public sector produc-
tion is cheaper and then privatization is 
not a preferable way of providing public 
goods.  
What we should emphasize is that the 
process of decision making in public sec-
tor is much more complex and unstable 
than  in  the  case  of  private  sector.  The 
separation of decision making and deci-
sion executing, and unclear distribution 
of responsibilities between them enhance 
the risk associated with PPP. The politi-
cal risk is one of the main causes why 
private sector avoids PPP. On the other 
hand there is often no social acceptance 
for  this  kind  of  delivering  of  public 
goods. In some cases it is reasonable e.g. 
because in a given country there is high 
level of corruption. But in the most cases 
the  problem  is  the  result  of  ignorance. 
The  lack  of  necessary  knowledge  pre-
cludes  an  effective  use  of  this  hybrid 
form  of  delivering  public  goods.  PPP 
isn’t  easy  and  does  not  always  work 
well.  But  if  we  stop  treating  state  and 
market as an alternative mechanisms for 
solving  social  problems  with  the  avail-
ability  of  public  goods,  we  can  gain 
more.  The  co-operation  in  PPP  means 
that state and its commercial partners go 





(1) Axelrode R., The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 1984. – (2) 
Blöndal J., Market Type Mechanisms and the Provision of Public Services, OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, Volume 5, No. 1, OECD 2005. – (3) Boone R.T., Macy M.W., 
Unlocking the Doors to Prisoner’s Dilemma: Dependence, Selectivity, and Coopera-
tion,  Social  Psychology  Quarterly,  March  1999.  –  (4)  European  Commission  (a), 
Guidelines for Public Private Partnerships, January 2003. – (5) European Commission 
(b),  Public  finances  in  EMU,  European  Economy,  3/2003  (2003).  
– (6) Golinowska S., Głogosz D. (red.), Pozarządowe instytucje społeczne. Między 
państwem  a  społeczeństwem,  Instytut  Pracy  i  Spraw  socjalnych,  Instytut  Polityki 
Społecznej  UW, Warszawa 1999. – (7) Grimsey D., Lewis M.K., Accounting for 
Public  Private  Partnership,  Accounting  Forum,  Sep-Dec  2002,  vol.  26,  Issue3/4.  
– (8) Grout, P. A, Public and private sector discount rates in public-private partner-
ships, Economic Journal, Mar 2003, Vol. 113 Issue 486. – (9) Linder S.H., Coming to 
terms  with the  public-private  partnership:  A  grammar  of  Multiple  Meanings,  The 
American Behavioural Scientist, Sep. 1999; 43, 1. – (10) Ministerstwo Gospodarki i 
Pracy, Departament Polityki Regionalnej, Partnerstwo publiczno-prywatne jako me-
toda realizacji zadań publicznych, Warszawa 2005. – (11) Nash J., The bargaining 
problems, „Econometria” 1950, no. 18. – (12) Rapoport A., Games, Peace&Change Gazdálkodás Vol. 51. Special edition No. 19 
 
101
1988, Vol. 13 Issue ¾.– (13) Raport Amerykańskiej Izby Handlowej w Polsce, Part-
nerstwo publiczno-prywatne jako metoda rozwoju infrastruktury w Polsce, Warszawa 
2002.  –  (14)  Scharle  P.,  Public  private  partnership  as  a  social  game,  Innovation, 
vol.15, no. 3, 2002. – (15) Schelling T.C., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge MA, 1960. – (16) Straffin P.D., Teoria gier, Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2004. – (17) Ustawa z dnia 28 lipca 2005 r. o part-
nerstwie publiczno-prywatnym (Dz.U. nr 169, poz. 1420). – (18) Yamagishi T., Na-
hoko H., Selective Play: Social Embeddedness of Social Dilemmas [in:] Liebrand W., 
Messick D., Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research, Springer, Berlin 1996. 
 